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More intensive copyright enforcement reduces piracy, raises prices, and lowers consumer
surplus. We show that these results do not hold regarding the extent rather than intensity
of enforcement. When enforcement is targeted at high-value buyers such as corporate and
government users, the copyright holder has an incentive to charge super-monopoly prices,
thereby encouraging piracy among low-value buyers. Extending enforcement down the de-
mand curve broadens the copyright holder’s captive market, leading to lower prices and
higher sales that can increase both proﬁts and consumer surplus. The standard tradeoﬀ be-
tween incentives to generate intellectual property and costs of monopoly power is therefore
avoided. Private enforcement by copyright holders may be insuﬃciently extensive since
consumers can also beneﬁt from more extensive enforcement. Similarly, new technologies
which lead to stronger control over illicit use can paradoxically beneﬁt consumers.
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Internet piracy threatens to reverse the success of many countries at controlling intellectual
property theft. By driving reproduction and distribution costs toward zero, the internet has
largely eliminated the cost advantages once held by legitimate producers. And by allowing
decentralized distribution through email and other peer-to-peer technologies, the internet has
greatly impeded anti-piracy eﬀorts. The resulting proliferation of free software and other
intellectual property led the U.S. to criminalize even non-commercial piracy under the No
Electronic Theft (NET) Act of 1997. Nevertheless, piracy rates appear to be rising after a
long period of decline.1
To evaluate copyright enforcement in this environment, we compare broad-based enforce-
ment with targeted enforcement aimed at speciﬁc users. Broad-based enforcement raises the
cost of piracy generally by, for instance, taxing new reproduction technologies (Johnson, 1985),
intercepting and destroying illegal copies, or prosecuting and penalizing distributors of pirated
goods. We argue that such strategies are of decreasing relevance due to the decentralized na-
ture of the internet. Instead, successful copyright enforcement must directly punish violations
by end-users. Such enforcement can be broad-based in that all consumers face the same risk of
enforcement. But in practice enforcement is usually targeted at large businesses and institu-
tions which are volume buyers and are more readily identiﬁed and monitored than individual
consumers. Since large organizations are also likely to place a higher value on the copyrighted
work than other buyers, enforcement is eﬀectively targeted at the high end of the demand
curve.
Broad-based enforcement reduces piracy by directly increasing the cost of buying or using
1The Business Software Alliance’s “Global Software Piracy Report” for 2000 showed an increase in world
piracy for the ﬁrst time in the survey’s history.
1pirated copies, but we ﬁnd that targeted enforcement can paradoxically increase piracy relative
to no enforcement under the standard Besen and Kirby (1989) assumption that pirated goods
are inferior substitutes for legitimate copies.2 Targeted enforcement gives the copyright holder
monopoly power over high-value buyers, encouraging the copyright holder to raise prices rather
than compete with pirated copies for sales to lower-value buyers. Since lower-value buyers face
higher prices for legitimate copies, but do not face higher piracy costs under the targeted policy,
they are induced to switch to inferior pirated copies. We ﬁnd that enforcement suﬃciently
concentrated on high-value buyers leads to more piracy than no enforcement. And if pirated
copies are valued by consumers proportionately to legitimate copies as assumed by Besen and
Kirby, any reasonable enforcement level leads to more piracy than no enforcement.
Regarding the impact of enforcement policies on social welfare, the tradeoﬀ between in-
centives to generate intellectual property investment and the costs of monopoly power has
long been recognized as the central issue in intellectual property rights (Arrow, 1962).3 We
show that this tradeoﬀ between copyright holder proﬁts and consumer surplus depends on the
assumption that copyright holders have a suﬃciently large captive market that they follow a
normal monopolistic strategy. If copyright holders are responsible for enforcement costs, we
ﬁnd conditions under which they will enforce a smaller captive market, implying that they will
charge a super-monopoly price. More extensive enforcement beneﬁts inframarginal consumers
because the copyright holder lowers the price toward the monopoly level to gain new customers.
We ﬁnd that if pirated copies are suﬃciently poor substitutes for legitimate copies, this gain
exceeds the losses to consumers at the margin who must buy the expensive legitimate copy
2For instance, pirated software may suﬀer from viruses or corrupted ﬁles. Help services and access to online
content may also be restricted to licensed users. In a world of zero copyright enforcement, reputable companies
could provide copies and related services of the same quality as those of the copyright holder. In this paper we
vary the degree of enforcement against end-users, but assume that there is always enough enforcement against
producers and distributors to prevent legitimate businesses from entering the bootleg industry.
3The tradeoﬀ occurs on a number of dimensions including the length of copyright protection, the extension
of copyright to derivative works, and the determination of how much material can be incorporated into new
works without violating the copyright (Landes and Posner, 1989).
2i n s t e a do ft h ep i r a t e dc o p y .T h e r e f o r eb o t hc o p y r i g h th o l d e rp r o ﬁts and consumer surplus rise
from more extensive enforcement. Even if pirated copies are arbitrarily close substitutes for
legitimate copies, there will be some range over which more extensive enforcement increases
both copyright holder proﬁts and consumer surplus.
If copyright is enforced only against high-value buyers, the copyright holder may also have
the opportunity to price discriminate between buyers. For instance, if businesses and con-
sumers are treated separately for copyright enforcement, it may also be possible to charge
them diﬀerent prices. The copyright holder can then charge a super-monopoly price to busi-
ness users and a discounted price for a non-business version that competes with pirated copies.
Since it is directed at lower-value buyers, this discounted price will be lower than the compet-
itive price without price discrimination, implying that piracy will fall rather than rise. As is
standard in price discrimination models, the monopolist will beneﬁt from price discrimination
and consumers might or might not beneﬁt. Regarding the marginal impact of more extensive
copyright enforcement,4 the basic results are unaﬀected by allowing for price discrimination.
In particular, more extensive enforcement can continue to raise rather than lower consumer
surplus.
The lack of conﬂict between consumer and copyright holder interests has implications for
enforcement policy. In their model of broad-based enforcement Chen and Png (1999) allow
ﬁrms to determine how much resources to devote to detecting piracy. They ﬁnd that ﬁrms
choose ineﬃciently intense monitoring because they do not internalize the losses to consumer
welfare. In our model of targeted enforcement we reach the opposite conclusion regarding how
extensive enforcement should be. Since both sides can beneﬁt from more extensive enforcement,
if the copyright holder alone is responsible for enforcement costs the result may be insuﬃcient
rather than excessive enforcement.5 As a result, technologies that strengthen the monitoring
4For instance, enforcement could be extended to small businesses, forcing them to pay for business rather
than home versions.
5This result has an interesting parallel in the literature on informative advertising. Even if informative
advertising increases prices by raising demand, consumers may still beneﬁt from the opportunity to purchase a
3and enforcement capabilities of the copyright holder need not lead to a loss in consumer
surplus.6 For instance, automated online authorization for use of software can broaden the
copyright holder’s captive market, reducing the price down to the normal monopoly level.
The idea that consumer and copyright holder interests need not be in conﬂict has been
argued from the opposite perspective that both sides can beneﬁt from lax enforcement due
to network eﬀects (Takeyama, 1994; Shy and Thisse, 1999, Slive and Bernhardt, 1999). In
network models broader distribution of the good increases its value to all users, implying
buyers of legitimate copies beneﬁt from piracy. Since the copyright holder can then charge
users a higher price, both sides beneﬁt from lax enforcement.7 Our model indicates that super-
monopoly pricing is a factor that can work in the opposite direction, encouraging both sides
to favor more extensive enforcement within a reasonable range.
2 Copyright enforcement in practice
The changing roles of broad-based and targeted enforcement are illustrated by the case of
software piracy. Before the rise of the internet, broad-based enforcement had stopped open
markets for pirated copies from arising in most large economies. While the United States
Trade Representative complained to Congress in 1996 that “compilation CDs” with $10,000 of
software could be purchased openly for $5 in Hong Kong,8 consumers in the United States did
product they would not otherwise have known about (Shapiro, 1980). Esteban, Gil and Hernandez (2001) ﬁnd
that a monopolist might ineﬃciently target high-value demanders and charge a high price rather than advertise
more broadly and charge a lower price. The advertising and enforcement models diﬀer in that more informative
advertising has a direct positive impact on consumers that may or may not be oﬀset by price eﬀects, while
greater copyright enforcement has a direct negative impact that may or may not be oﬀset by price eﬀects.
6Much of the controversy surrounding the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 relates to the role of
these technologies. Other potential beneﬁts are more eﬃcient contracting (Dam, 1999) and improved price
discrimination (Meurer, 1997).
7Ad i ﬀerent argument also supports the idea that weak enforcement helps the copyright holder. In a durable
monopoly model, allowing bootleggers to satisfy demand from low-value buyers allows the copyright holder to
credibly commit to maintaining high prices (Takeyama, 1997).
8Testimony before the Senate Finance Committee by US Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky on June
6, 1996.
4not have such easy and inexpensive access to pirated software. In a few years, the situation
changed dramatically. Checks by the Business Software Alliance (BSA) in 1999 found over
two million websites worldwide that oﬀered, linked to, or discussed pirated software under
the standard term “warez”9 and more than 368,000 web pages that oﬀered “crackz” to defeat
copy protection measures.10 Even before its oﬃcial unveiling, Microsoft discovered over 100
websites oﬀering free downloads of Windows 2000.11 And a 2000 survey of internet auction
sites in the United States found that 91% of software for sale was pirated.12
Although software companies are attempting to disrupt online distribution of pirated soft-
ware just as they have successfully disrupted oﬄine distribution in many countries, the futility
of these attempts is widely recognized. As the BSA website acknowledges, “Bookmarking a
‘Top 10 Warez Sitez’ page is an easy way of ﬁnding all the illegal software you could ever
want.” Partly due to the problem of identifying the creators and operators of pirate websites,
the ﬁrst convictions under the 1997 No Electronic Theft (NET) Act were not obtained until
May of 2001. The rise of peer-to-peer technologies such as Gnutella and Morpheus for sharing
ﬁles makes it even more unlikely that access to pirated software can be restricted.
Given the diﬃculty of raising piracy costs to consumers through disrupting easy access
to pirated copies, the software industry has continued to pursue enforcement directly at end-
users. In practice, this has meant enforcement targeted against large institutions. The BSA,
the software industry’s primary organization to combat piracy, states that “...the business
software industry’s anti-piracy activities focus on corporate rather than home users...”13 The
industry has also been active in combating “government piracy”, successfully lobbying for an
9September 14, 1999 BSA press release.
10Presentation by Robert Holleyman, President of the BSA, at the World Intellectual Property Organization
Conference on Electronic Commerce and Intellectual Property, Geneva, 1999.
11Reuters, February 11, 2000.
12Press release by Software & Information Industry Association, April 12, 2000. The survey found prices as
low as $13 for software retailing at $609. That buyers were willing to pay at all for software freely available
elsewhere may reﬂect buyer beliefs that they were purchasing legitimate used software.
13“Software Piracy in the European Union,” BSA, January 1999.
5executive order to institute procedures ensuring legal software usage within the US government,
the world’s largest software consumer. This order also directed the US Trade Representative
to use its powers to push for similar decrees in other countries.14
Clearly one reason for not targeting home users is they place lower valuations on most
software, implying smaller gains from forcing the use of legitimate software. Another problem
is the likely diﬃculty of obtaining convictions against home users. One survey found that only
14% of respondents thought illegally copying a software program was a serious crime, compared
to 30% who felt the same about driving at 40 MPH in a 25 MPH zone.15 The disjunct between
these attitudes and the draconian punishments for piracy16 may explain why it appears that
no home software user in the United States has ever been convicted of copyright violations for
personal use of pirated software.
3 Broad-based copyright enforcement
Enforcement that disrupts distribution channels or limits access to copying technologies raises
the cost of pirated copies to all customers. For instance, until recently most developed countries
had successfully excluded open markets for pirated copies of books, music and software, thereby
forcing consumers to incur the time costs of arranging for and making private copies. And a
number of European countries have collected levies on blank recording machinery and media
to compensate copyright holders for likely piracy (Besen and Raskind, 1991). The rise of
the internet has altered this situation greatly, but as a reference point we ﬁrst consider the
impact of copyright enforcement against all consumers. In practice such enforcement will aﬀect
diﬀerent buyers to diﬀerent degrees, but to make a clear comparison with enforcement which
is targeted solely at high-value buyers we assume enforcement raises costs uniformally.
14The Special 301 Report on Intellectual Property Rights by the US Trade Representative, May 2000.
15Survey conducted by Yankelovich Partners for the BSA as cited in “Take a Byte Out of Software” published
by BSA at http://www.bsa.org.
16Under Title 18 of the US Code, Section 2319, a ﬁrst oﬀense for making or distributing over 10c o p i e so ft h e
same or diﬀerent work is punishable by up to three years in prison.
6Besen and Kirby’s standard model of piracy diﬀerentiates between the case where buyers are
willing to pay no more than their own valuation for the legitimate copy (direct appropriability)
and the case where buyers will pay above their own valuation because they can beneﬁtf r o m
sharing or selling copies of the work (indirect appropriability). While the latter case suggests a
number of interesting pricing strategies (Liebowitz, 1985; Bakos, Brynjolfsson and Lichtman,
1999; Varian, 2000), Besen and Kirby note that a consumer has little incentive to pay above
her own valuation when markets for pirated copies are competitive. Since the rise of internet
piracy has driven the cost of pirated copies eﬀectively to zero, we use their model of direct
appropriability.17 Although they only consider enforcement policies that either allow or do
not allow copying, their model is readily reinterpreted to accommodate diﬀering degrees of
enforcement. In particular they assume that piracy incurs higher copying costs than legitimate
production. Since the internet has largely eliminated copying costs, we will interpret any
costs to consumers from acquiring illegal copies as a measure of the intensity of copyright
enforcement.18
Following their model, we assume buyers can purchase a legitimate copy of a copyrighted
good from the copyright holder, purchase a pirated copy from a bootlegger, or not buy a copy
at all.19 Each buyer q values the legitimate copy more highly, and buyers with higher valuations
of the legitimate copy also have higher valuations of the pirated copy. Let buyer values (or
willingness to pay) for the legitimate and pirated copies be represented by the functions V (q)
and v(q) respectively which are bounded, continuous, and diﬀerentiable over q ∈ [0,Q]. We
assume that V (q) >v (q) > 0f o rq ∈ [0,Q), V (Q)=v(Q) = 0, and V 0(q) <v 0(q) < 0f o r
q ∈ [0,Q].
17Indirect appropriability remains relevant for legal distribution such as software companies charging more
for site licences.
18Besen and Kirby consider royalty payments payable to the copyright holder that increase the cost of copies,
such as occur through the Copyright Clearance Center in the U.S., but this is a separate issue from uncompen-
sated piracy.
19O u ra n a l y s i si sl i m i t e dt oas i n g l ep r o d u c ts ow ed on o tc o n s i d e rt h ei n t e r n e t ’ sr o l ei ne x p a n d i n go p p o r t u n i t i e s
to bundle multiple information goods (Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1998).
7Since the marginal cost of producing and distributing pirated copies is zero, the equilibrium
price of such copies is zero in the absence of copyright enforcement. Enforcement imposes a
cost c w h i c hc a nb ev i e w e da se i t h e rp a i db yt h eb o o t l e g g e r so rb yt h ec o n s u m e r so fp i r a t e d
copies. In either case consumer q receives surplus v(q) − c from acquiring a pirated copy. Let
qb represent the marginal consumer whose valuation of a pirated copy equals the cost c of
potentially being caught. Given that the value of a legitimate copy is V (q), the copyright
holder can charge no more than V (q) − (v(q) − c)t oc o n s u m e r sq<q b,b u tc a nc h a r g ea s
much as V (q)t oc o n s u m e r sq ≥ qb. The (inverse) demand function facing the copyright holder
therefore has two sections,
p(q,c)=
(
V (q) − (v(q) − c)f o r q<q b
V (q)f o r q ≥ qb
)
.
Let qm represent the proﬁt maximizing output for a complete monopoly,
qm =a r gm a x
q {V (q)q},
and let qc represent the proﬁt-maximizing output when the copyright holder competes with
bootleggers,
qc =a r gm a x
q {(V (q) − (v(q) − c))q}.
To ensure qm and qc a r eu n i q u ew ea s s u m et h a tm a r g i n a lr e v e n u ef o rl e g i t i m a t ec o p i e si s
monotonically decreasing in q over both sections of the demand curve, ∂2V (q)q/(∂q)2 < 0
and ∂2(V (q) − v(q))q/(∂q)2 < 0. The copyright holder will act like a regular monopoly and
produce qm if c is suﬃciently high that qb ≤ qm. If enforcement is not that strong then the
copyright holder will produce either at qc or at the kink qb depending on which generates the
most proﬁts.
Figure 1 shows the copyright holder’s demand function when the value of legitimate copies
is V (q)=100−q, the value of pirated copies is v(q)=( 100−q)/3, and broad-based enforcement
imposes a cost c = 10 on consumption of pirated copies. Since the bootleg market is competitive
8Figure 1: Broad-based enforcement with intensity c = 10.
a consumer can receive surplus v(q) − c by purchasing a pirated copy, implying all consumers
q<q b are potentially in the market for pirated copies. In the range q ≥ qb the copyright holder
can act as a monopolist. In this example qm =5 0 ,qc =5 7 .5, and qb = 70. Since qb >q m,
t h ec h o i c ei sb e t w e e nqc and qb, with the former generating the most proﬁts. As c increases,
the ﬁrst section of the demand curve rises and the kink in the demand curve occurs at lower
quantities, implying the demand function becomes closer and closer to that of a monopoly.
Higher c makes the option of acquiring the pirated copy less attractive, so the copyright holder
can squeeze out a higher price for the legitimate copy, thereby increasing proﬁts and reducing
consumer surplus. Although enforcement is broad-based, its eﬀect is borne most obviously by
low-value buyers. Since they can neither aﬀord the legitimate copy nor continue to purchase
the pirated copy due to the higher costs, they leave the market. The result is less piracy, but
at the cost of less consumption.
The following proposition shows that the results from the above example hold quite gen-
9erally. The only exception is that if the marginal revenue curve is less steep than the demand
curve, as can occur with some non-linear demand curves, the ﬁrm might respond to higher
enforcement costs with lower prices.
Proposition 1. More intensive broad-based enforcement (i) raises the legitimate copy price and
decreases consumer surplus if the marginal revenue curve is steeper than the demand curve
and (ii) always increases copyright holder proﬁts and reduces piracy.
Proof:I f qb ≤ qm the ﬁrm will produce at qm and more intensive enforcement has no additional
impact, implying all the relations hold weakly. So we restrict attention to qm <q b,w h i c hh a s
two cases, qc,qm <q b and qm <q b ≤ qc.
(i) Regarding the price, for qc,qm <q b changes in c aﬀect the price directly by shift-
ing the demand curve and also indirectly via qc, the proﬁt maximizing choice of q. Totally




















which is positive as long as ∂p(q,c)/∂q>∂2(p(q,c)q)/(∂q)2.F o r qm <q b ≤ qc the ﬁrm








so an increase in c leads to a movement up the V (q)curve, implying a higher price. Regarding
the consumer surplus, if ∂p(q,c)/∂q>∂2(p(q,c)q)/(∂q)2 then as shown the price rises in both
cases, implying buyers of the legitimate good lose. Buyers of the pirated good always lose
directly from increases in c.
10(ii) Regarding proﬁts, for qc,qm <q b proﬁts are given by
Π =( V (qc) − v(qc)+c)qc.
Since qc is chosen to maximize proﬁts, by application of the envelope theorem,
dΠ
dc
= qc > 0.
For qm <q b ≤ qc the ﬁrm chooses to produce at the kink in the demand function at qb. Since qb
is decreasing in c the ﬁrm moves closer to monopoly output as c increases. By the assumption
∂2V (q)q/(∂q)2 < 0t h i si m p l i e sh i g h e rp r o ﬁts. Regarding piracy, it only occurs for qb >q c,qm.
As noted dqc/dc = −1/(∂2(p(q,c)q)/(∂q)2) which is positive by the assumption that marginal
revenue is decreasing. Since dqb/dc < 0 as shown above the piracy range (qc,qb] shrinks. ¥
4 Targeted “top-down” copyright enforcement
We now consider the same model except that only the highest value buyers face any enforce-
ment against piracy. As argued, we believe this represents the current status of enforcement
since home piracy is not normally penalized. With targeted enforcement the issue is not how
intensive enforcement is, but rather how far down the demand curve enforcement extends.20
Assuming enforcement extent qe, meaning all buyers q ≤ qe must purchase from the copyright
holder,21 the copyright holder again faces a demand curve with separate segments. For quanti-
ties less than qe, demand is given by buyer valuations V (q) independent of the bootleg market.
For quantities greater than qe the copyright holder must oﬀer a price suﬃciently low to entice
buyers away from pirated copies. Since the price in the bootleg market is zero, consumer q
20An interesting possibility is enforcement directed only against low-value demanders. While enforcement
against high-value demanders leads to a negative externality on other demanders by raising the monopoly
price, enforcement against low-value demanders leads to a positive externality by reducing the price. Such
“bottom-up” enforcement does not appear to be observed in practice.
21We will assume enforcement is suﬃciently intense to prevent buyers q<q
e from buying the pirated good.
From the perspective of the broad-based enforcement model, the cost c is at least V (q)−v(q)f o rb u y e r sq<q
e
and zero for all other buyers.
11receives surplus v(q) from acquiring a pirated copy, implying the copyright holder can charge
no more than V (q)−v(q). The (inverse) demand function for the copyright holder is therefore
p(q,qe)=
(
V (q)f o r q ≤ qe
V (q) − v(q)f o r q>q e
)
.
The quantity that maximizes monopoly proﬁts is again qm =a r gm a x {V (q)q} while the quan-
tity that maximizes proﬁts in competition with the inferior oﬀerings of bootleggers is now
qc =a r g m a x {(V (q) − v(q))q}. Ideally, the copyright holder would like to sell the monopoly
output qm at the monopoly price, but if qe <q m then the seller must choose whether to
sell at a super-monopoly price to the captive market of buyers q ≤ qe or to compete with
bootleggers and sell output qc at a lower price. Clearly the competitive strategy generates
more proﬁts when qe is so low that there are very few buyers to squeeze with a higher price.
And as qe approaches qc the super-monopoly pricing strategy generates more proﬁts since
V (q) >V(q) − v(q). We are interested in the exact enforcement level such that the copyright
holder is indiﬀerent between the two strategies. Note that, ignoring any ﬁxed costs, copyright
holder proﬁts without competition are a strictly concave function of sales, are zero for zero sales
and increasing at that point, reach a maximum at qm,a n da r ez e r of o rs u ﬃciently large sales.
Again ignoring any ﬁxed costs, proﬁts in competition with bootleggers are (V (qc) − v(qc))qc
which are strictly positive and strictly less than V (qm)qm so there are exactly two quantities
at which V (q)q =( V (qc)−v(qc))qc.L e te q<q m be the minimum of these, so that at qe = e q the
copyright holder is indiﬀerent between charging a super-monopoly price and competing with
bootleggers.
F i g u r e2s h o w st h es a m ec a s ea st h a to fF i g u r e1 except copyrights are strictly enforced
for q ≤ 30 and not enforced for q>30. The demand curve is diﬀerent than under broad-based
enforcement because high-value rather than low-value buyers are most directly aﬀected. In
this example with linear demand and zero marginal costs the monopoly output is qm =5 0s o
the copyright holder would like to charge monopoly prices to a larger group than is possible
given the extent of enforcement. The copyright holder can choose to charge a super-monopoly
12Figure 2: Targeted enforcement with extent qe =3 0 .
price at q = 30 or to operate more competitively along the lower section of the demand curve.
Since e q . =2 1.1 in this example, enforcement is suﬃciently extensive for the super-monopoly
pricing strategy to generate more proﬁts.22
The impact on copyright holder proﬁts and consumer surplus of diﬀerent levels of enforce-
ment is shown in Figure 3. At a low level of enforcement the ﬁrm is better oﬀ s t i c k i n gt oi t s
competitive strategy of selling qc units at a low price, so proﬁts are initially unaﬀected by more
extensive enforcement. When enforcement reaches qe = e q the ﬁrm switches to the strategy of
selling only qe units at a super-monopoly price, so proﬁts begin to rise. Further increases in
enforcement allow the copyright holder to sell to a larger number of captive customers until
enforcement reaches qe = qm, after which the ﬁrm sells only qm units regardless of the enforce-
22Under this strategy the price is 70 and proﬁts are 2100. Following the competitive strategy the copyright
holder would choose to operate at q
c =5 0( a ss h o w ni nP r o p o s i t i o n2 ,q
c = q
m since the goods are valued
proportionately in this example) and charge price p =3 3
1
3, giving proﬁts of 1666
2
3.
13ment level. Considering consumer surplus, low levels of enforcement have no impact since the
monopolist continues to compete with bootleggers. But consumer surplus drops sharply once
the monopolist switches from selling qc units to selling only qe units since high-value buyers
pay a super-monopoly price and since many buyers are forced by the higher price to switch to
the lower quality pirated copy. As enforcement is extended further, the copyright holder lowers
prices to sell to the newly captive customers, and after an initial dip, consumer surplus rises
until qe = qm.O v e rt h er a n g eqe ∈ [25,50] there is no conﬂict between copyright holder proﬁts
and consumer surplus. Yet further extension of enforcement does not aﬀect proﬁts since the
ﬁrm sticks with the proﬁt-maximizing quantity qm, but consumer surplus falls since lower-value
buyers who would never purchase legitimate copies at the monopoly price are prohibited from
purchasing pirated copies.23
Figure 3 shows that enforcement which is too low (qe < e q)i ss u pe r ﬂuous since it has no eﬀect
on copyright holder behavior, and enforcement which is too high (qe >q m)i sg r a t u i t o u ss i n c e
it hurts consumers but does not beneﬁt the copyright holder. Regarding what enforcement level
is “optimal”, the gains and losses to consumers are clear, but the beneﬁts of giving stronger
incentives to generate intellectual property could vary widely depending on the particular
circumstances. We can only note that any reasonable social welfare function should be a
positive function of consumer surplus, a positive function of copyright holder proﬁts, and
a negative function of enforcement costs. We can then rule out an enforcement extent as
ineﬃcient if a lower extent could attain the same or higher levels of both copyright holder
proﬁts and consumer surplus.
The conclusion from Figure 3 that non-zero enforcement extent qe / ∈ [e q,qm]i si n e ﬃcient
clearly holds generally. For qe ∈ [e q,qm], copyright holder proﬁts are strictly increasing because
23In this example with linear demand the total surplus (copyright holder proﬁts plus consumer surplus) is




m the copyright holder will produce
the same amount (at lower prices) with enforcement less than q
e ≤ e q as it will with enforcement q
e ≥ q
m. In
general the total surplus may be higher or lower with no enforcement than with enforcement q
e = q
m.
14Figure 3: Proﬁts, surplus from targeted enforcement with extent qe.
marginal revenue is strictly decreasing in q and marginal revenue equals zero at q = qm.
Since more extensive enforcement in this range strengthens incentives to generate intellectual
property, any enforcement extent qe ∈ [e q,qm] is potentially eﬃcient for some social welfare
function. Therefore we are primarily interested in enforcement levels within this range.
Proposition 2. Relative to no enforcement, targeted enforcement (i) raises the legitimate copy
price, increases copyright holder proﬁts, and decreases consumer surplus for all qe ≥ e q,a n d( i i )
increases piracy if (a) qe ∈ [e q,min{qc,qm}] generally or (b) qe ∈ [e q,qm]a n dp i r a t e dc o p i e sa r e
valued proportionately to legitimate copies.
Proof: (i) For qe ∈ [0, e q) the copyright holder chooses output qc and price V (qc) − v(qc)s o
enforcement has no eﬀect. For qe ∈ [e q,qm]t h eﬁrm chooses output qe and the super-monopoly
price V (qe) which leads to higher proﬁts and lower consumer surplus. For qe ∈ (qm,Q]t h eﬁrm
chooses the monopoly output qm and the monopoly price V (qm), again implying higher proﬁts
and lower consumer surplus. (ii-a) Without any enforcement the copyright holder chooses
15output qc, implying the piracy range is (qc,Q]. For enforcement levels qe ∈ [e q,qm] the copyright
holder chooses output qe, implying the piracy range is (qe,Q]. If qc <q m then piracy increases
for qe ∈ [e q,qc], while if qm <q c then piracy increases for qe ∈ [e q,qm]. (ii-b) It is suﬃcient to
show that qc = qm.I fv(q)=αV (q)w h e r e0< α < 1 then qc =a r gm a x q{(1−α)V (q)q}.S i n c e
qm =a r gm a x q{V (q)q}, the maximizing quantities are identical. ¥
As seen from Figure 3, enforcement which is just suﬃcient to induce the copyright holder
to adopt the super-monopoly pricing strategy has a large negative impact on consumer surplus
and comparatively little impact on copyright holder proﬁts. But this pessimistic conclusion
only applies to a comparison of some enforcement and no enforcement. Given that some
enforcement is pursued, more extensive enforcement can lower the legitimate copy price and
thereby increases sales. Although consumers on the margin of enforcement lose, inframarginal
consumers beneﬁt from the lower price. In the example of Figure 3 consumers gain from more
extensive enforcement over most of the non-superﬂuous, non-gratuitous range. The following
proposition shows that consumers always beneﬁt over some range.
Proposition 3. More extensive enforcement in qe ∈ [e q,qm) (i) lowers the legitimate copy price,
increases copyright holder proﬁts, and reduces piracy generally and (ii) increases consumer
surplus if (a) qe is suﬃciently close to qm or (b) pirated copies are suﬃciently poor substitutes
for legitimate copies.
Proof: (i) T h ep r i c ei nt h i sr a n g ei sV (qe) which is decreasing in qe. Monopoly proﬁts are
increasing for qe ∈ [e q,qm) since marginal revenue is assumed to be monotonically decreasing
in q and is zero at qm.F o rqe ∈ [e q,qm] the piracy range is (qe,Q] which is decreasing in qe.










dqe = V (qe) − V (qe) − qeV 0(qe) − v(qe)
= −V 0(qe)qe − v(qe).
From the ﬁrst order condition for proﬁt maximization,
V 0(qm)qm + V (qm)=0
so
dCS
dqe |qe=qm= V (qm) − v(qm) > 0,
implying by continuity of V (q)a n dv(q)t h a tdCS/dqe > 0f o rqe suﬃciently close to qm.
(ii-b) Since −V 0(qe)qe > 0, therefore dCS/dqe > 0f o rv(qe)s u ﬃciently small. ¥
The coincidence of consumer and copyright holder interests has implications for who should
bear the costs of enforcement. If only the copyright holder beneﬁted, private enforcement by
the copyright holder through civil cases would be adequate. But if consumers beneﬁtf r o m
extending enforcement more broadly, private enforcement may be inadequate. To examine this
issue, let the cost of enforcement be the continuous function e(qe)w h e r ee(0) = 0, e0(qe) > 0,
and e00(qe) ≥ 0 for all qe.24 And let q∗ be the proﬁt-maximizing extent of enforcement. The
copyright holder will then choose q∗ <q m because proﬁts as a function of q are ﬂat at q = qm.
If consumer surplus is increasing at q∗ private enforcement will be insuﬃciently extensive,
providing a rationale for public expenditures on enforcement. From Proposition 3 consumer
surplus is increasing in qe if qe is suﬃciently close to qm. Since the copyright holder will choose
qe arbitrarily close to qm for suﬃciently low enforcement costs, the ﬁrst part of the following
proposition holds. Also from Proposition 3, consumer surplus is increasing in qe throughout the
eﬃcient range if pirated copies are suﬃciently poor substitutes for legitimate copies, thereby
implying the second part of the following proposition.
24This formulation of enforcement costs captures only enforcement extent. As shown by Chen and Png (1999)
opposing results are obtained for enforcement intensity.
17Proposition 4. If the copyright holder chooses the enforcement extent and bears all enforce-
ment costs, enforcement will be insuﬃciently extensive if (i) the marginal cost of extending
enforcement e0(q∗)i ss u ﬃciently low or (ii) pirated copies are suﬃciently poor substitutes for
legitimate copies.
The existence of diﬀerential enforcement raises the issue of price discrimination. In par-
ticular, if the copyright holder can diﬀerentiate between business and home users suﬃciently
to target enforcement at the former group, it may also be able to charge the groups diﬀerent
prices. Clearly the results of Proposition 2 regarding piracy no longer hold when targeted
enforcement allows price discrimination to become possible. The ﬁrm can sell to the captive
market at a super-monopoly price and set a discounted price to compete with bootleggers in
the remaining non-captive market. Since the non-captive market is comprised of lower-value
buyers, the price is lower and there is less piracy. As is standard with third-degree price dis-
crimination, the impact on copyright holder proﬁts is positive while the impact on consumer
s u r p l u si sa m b i g u o u s .
Regarding marginal increases in the extent of enforcement, the main results of Propositions
3 and 4 are unaﬀe c t e db yp r i c ed i s c r i m i n a t i o n . I np a r t i c u l a r ,a ss h o w ni nP r o p o s i t i o n3 0
in the appendix, more extensive enforcement continues to raise rather than lower consumer
surplus for qe suﬃciently close to qm. And as shown in Proposition 40 in the appendix, private
enforcement by the ﬁrm will still be insuﬃciently extensive for low enforcement costs. Note
though that the eﬀect of extending enforcement is more complicated with discrimination than
without it. Marginal consumers who are switched from the non-captive to captive market
are hurt more by the extension of enforcement because they were able to buy the legitimate
copy at a reasonable price in the non-captive market. Counteracting this loss is the gain to
extramarginal consumers in the non-captive market. Without price discrimination they are
unaﬀected by changes in enforcement but with price discrimination they face a more favorable
price when the captive market expands. Since the non-captive market loses its higher value
18members to the captive market, the copyright holder responds by lowering its discounted price.
In the parameterized example used in Figure 3 the net result is that consumer surplus is rising
in the range qe ∈ [331
3,50], a smaller range than without price discrimination.
5 Conclusion
This paper shows that broad-based and targeted copyright enforcement have diﬀerent implica-
tions for ﬁrm pricing strategies, piracy, and social welfare. Broad-based copyright enforcement
raises prices toward the monopoly level, reduces piracy, and lowers consumer surplus. In
contrast, enforcement targeted at high-value buyers leads to super-monopoly prices and an
increase in piracy. Extending the range of targeted enforcement down the demand curve can
then lower prices toward the monopoly level, reducing piracy and potentially increasing both
monopoly proﬁts and consumer surplus.
Our model is most appropriate for copyright enforcement but is also relevant for patent and
trademark enforcement. Unlike copyright piracy, patent infringement is often limited to a small
number of companies who must make substantial investments in production capacity and are
easily monitored. But in countries with a large number of producers the targeted enforcement
model may be applicable. For instance, the pharmaceutical industries in India and China are
highly competitive with hundreds of producers. A targeted enforcement policy requiring the
most reputable and most proﬁtable producers to pay licensing fees to patent holders would
have similar eﬀects as discussed in this paper.25 From an international perspective, if patent
infringement is prevented in richer countries but not in poorer countries then the model also
applies. Regarding trademark infringement, enforcement is primarily targeted at distribution
channels and retailers, thereby raising costs to all consumers and making the broad-based
enforcement model more appropriate. The targeted enforcement model applies if enforcement
25However, in the United States at least there is evidence that smaller ﬁrms are at a legal disadvantage in
patent disputes (Lanjouw and Lerner, 1997) and might therefore be more attractive enforcement targets.
19is primarily directed at prestigious retail outlets servicing high-value buyers.
6A p p e n d i x
Proposition 30. If price discrimination between captive and non-captive markets is possible,
more extensive enforcement in qe ∈ [0,qm) (i) lowers the captive market price and the non-
captive market discounted price and reduces piracy generally and (ii) increases consumer sur-
plus if qe is suﬃciently close to qm.
Proof: (i) T h ec a p t i v em a r k e tp r i c ei ss t i l lV (qe) which is decreasing in qe.L e tt h eq u a n t i t y
sold by the copyright holder in the non-captive market be qd where
qd =a r gm a x
q {(V (qe + q) − v(qe + q))q}
From total diﬀerentiation of the ﬁrst order conditions,
dqd
dqe = −
V 00(qe + qd) − v00(qe + qd)+V 0(qe + qd) − v0(qe + qd)
V 00(qe + qd) − v00(qe + qd)+2( V 0(qe + qd) − v0(qe + qd))
> −1
implying that qe+qd rises as qe rises. The price in the non-captive market, V (qe+qd)−v(qe+qd),
is therefore decreasing in qe. The piracy range is (qe + qd,Q]f o rqe ∈ [0,qm] so piracy falls.
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´ dqd






= −V 0(qe)qe − V (qe)+V (qe + qd) − v(qe + qd) −
³









20Recall that V (q) >v (q)a n dV 0(q) <v 0(q) for all q and V 0(qm)qm = V (qm). Therefore by
the same argument as in Proposition 3 (ii-a), for qe suﬃciently close to qm, dCS/dqe > 0i f
dqd/dqe > −1, as established in (i). ¥
Proposition 40. If the copyright holder chooses the enforcement extent and bears all en-
forcement costs, enforcement will be insuﬃciently extensive if the marginal cost of extending
enforcement e0(q∗)i ss u ﬃciently low.
Proof: By deﬁnition, q∗ =a r g m a x qe V (qe)qe +
¡
V (qe + qd) − v(qe + qd)
¢
qd − e(qe). The
ﬁrst order condition for proﬁt maximization is
V 0(q∗)q∗ + V (q∗)+
³

























which is strictly positive for e0(q∗)s u ﬃciently small. ¥
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